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Abstract
Previous research of inter-organizational relations suggest that they are too complex to
grasp in terms of simple, linear effects from independent on dependent variables. Many
variables are involved, and most of them influence each other, in circular causality. The
central reason for this is that enduring, fruitful relations are based on interaction and mutual
dependence. There is no clear “principal” controlling an “agent”. Especially mechanisms of
trust are inherently circular. This article employs the LISREL method to identify and map
causal loops involved. This is done on the basis of an extensive data set on supply
relationships in the US auto industry. Several causal loops are identified. For example: a
direct effect of dedicated investments is that they create a “hold-up” risk, but an indirect
effect is that they also increase the dependence of the partner and thereby reduce the risk.1
1. Introduction
1
Many Western automobile producers are changing their traditional arm’s-length supply
relationships – characterized by discrete transactions and short-term relations – towards
more continuous and more open-ended relationships (Helper, 1990; 1994; Sako, 1992).
This trend is partly inspired by the Japanese achievements: it has been widely
acknowledged that the Japanese long-term, cooperative relationships of producers with
main suppliers have played a key role in the competitive advantage of the Japanese
automobile producers (Cusumano, 1985; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993; Fuss and Waverman,
1992; Nishiguchi, 1994; Martin et al., 1995).
A ‘long-term supply relationship’ is a specific form of organization which has
three main characteristic features. Firstly, two firms – a customer and a supplier – are
jointly involved in the development and production of a final-market product. The supplier
may be a financially independent up-stream firm or a partially integrated division but often
maintains organizational autonomy. The customer usually is the largest of both, is
financially independent, and assembles the final-market product. Secondly, at any given
point in time many firm- and relation-specific characteristics are at play. For example, past
experience, future expectations, dependence, trust, commitment, and uncertainty all may
influence behavior in the relationship, and are also the outcome of the relationship. Thirdly,
in the overall causal system of a relation, variables have influences on other variables and
are in turn affected by them. For example, trust can be the outcome of a long-term
relationship and may determine commitment, dependence, and future perspectives.
Commitment can be influenced by dependence and may determine future perspectives as
well. Earlier studies (Berger et al., 1995; Nooteboom et al., 1997) indicated that while
dedicated investments increase dependence due to the risk of hold-up, they increase one’s
value to the partner which makes him dependent as well, which reduces risk of hold-up.
Hence, a long-term, cooperative supply relationship can be thought of as a web of
intertwined firm- and relation-specific characteristics. The contribution of this paper is to
unravel the mutual dependencies.
The outline of this paper is as follows. The following section provides the
theoretical basis for this study. It builds on two extensions of transaction cost economics:
the development of competencies, rather than only the utilization of existing competencies,
and trust next to opportunism. On the basis of that theoretical perspective, twenty-five
hypotheses are specified for causal relations between fifteen constructs. These yield a web
of causal relations which are tested by means of LISREL on data which were collected in a
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survey of the US automobile industry. The final section discusses the empirical results and
indicates remaining questions.
2. A Theory of Inter-Firm Relations
This study’s theoretical point of departure is transaction cost economics, as developed by
Williamson (1975, 1985). In line with Coase (1937), Williamson explains the existence of
firms in terms of comparative cost advantages, with transactions as the basic unit of
analysis. He considers ex ante as well as ex post costs of contractual hazards. Transaction
cost economics has contributed greatly to the study of interorganizational exchange with its
analysis of problems of coordination and mutual dependence. It offers several key variables
such as asset-specificity and uncertainty as well as expected causalities between the
variables which are important in interorganizational exchange.
However, long-term, cooperative supply relationships are a form of organization
which cannot be assimilated completely into Williamson’s (1985) framework. In many
situations, two firms engage in transactions with highly specific investments under
conditions of great uncertainty, but deliberately seem to forego the opportunity of vertical
integration and often do not develop other classical safeguards against the hazards of
opportunism. Thus, complementary insights are needed to understand such relationships.
This study employs two extensions. First, it draws on Nooteboom’s (1992a) general
transaction cost theory which offers a wider definition of the firm than is employed in
transaction cost economics. Second, following the studies of Helper (1987), Sako (1992),
and Nooteboom (1996), it will incorporate two relational features namely commitment and
intentional trust.
Nooteboom’s (1992a) generalized transaction cost theory offers insights for
various forms of ongoing interorganizational exchange.
2 Nooteboom incorporates the
“resource” or “competence” based view that different firms have different firm-specific
competencies and that interorganizational exchange facilitates the transfer and building of
competencies (cf. Foss and Knudsen, 1996; Penrose, 1959). A central feature of this is that
competencies are to some extent firm-specific, and cumulative: one acquires competencies
on the basis of existing ones, which determine the firm’s “absorptive capacity” (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Whereas Williamson focuses on static efficiency – efficiency is
maximized by trading off production costs, transaction costs, and costs of organization
given a certain state of knowledge, technology, and preference – Nooteboom employs a
dynamic efficiency principle. Dynamic efficiency is defined as efficiency in innovation
which is characterized by shifts of knowledge, technology, and preference. Nooteboom
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argues that ongoing interaction between a customer and a supplier is necessary in order to
acquire or develop competencies. In case of tacit knowledge, for example, ongoing
interaction facilitates the transfer of knowledge – in learning by doing or exchange of the
carriers of the knowledge – that would not otherwise be possible. Further, in transaction
relations the linkage between firms with different complementary perspectives and
competencies requires a basis for communication. This takes time to develop, on the basis
of interaction, and represents a specific investment.
Transaction cost economics has a limited perspective on the ‘value of the partner’
because it emphasizes the cost economizing relevance of interorganizational exchange, and
ignores the issues of learning or developing competencies. The competence perspective, as
employed by Nooteboom, offers a much wider perspective. Very often, interorganizational
exchange is not only intended to minimize the total transaction, production and
organization costs as Williamson suggests. It may also be for reasons of strategy – e.g. to
gain access to resources or for (foreign) market entry – but foremost for the development
and exchange of organizational competencies. Notwithstanding the importance of
efficiency, value may include many more dimensions such as developmental capacity,
flexibility, and value as a source of learning. These partner features relative to other
available alternatives determine the partner’s value. Since the acquisition of new
competencies depends on existing competencies (“absorptive capacity”), one may need to
employ competencies of a partner even when transaction costs are high, with highly
specific investments. This explains why firms do not always engage in integration when
such investments occur. Furthermore, one needs such outside partnerships more to the
extent that there is more uncertainty in the sense that technology and markets are more
complex and variable. This is the opposite from the thesis from classical transaction cost
economics that greater uncertainty will yield more integration.
The second extension follows the studies of Helper (1987), Sako (1992), and
Nooteboom (1996). These authors argue that for a better understanding of ongoing
interorganizational exchange we need to consider not incidental and unrelated transactions
as in transaction cost economics but transactions in the setting of an exchange relationship.
Not the transaction but the relation is the unit of analysis. An important cause as well as a
consequence of repeated interaction among firms is the emergence of commitment and
trust. These two relational features influence the choice of, or may even explain the lack of,
governance structures. Contrary to Williamson’s (1993) rejection of trust that goes beyond
calculative self-interest, the authors argue that such trust does arise, although they would
agree with Williamson that this should not lead to blind trust.
Adopting Hirschman’s (1970) terminology, Helper (1987) identifies two types of
responses to problems namely ‘exit’, where the customer firm’s response to problems with4
a supplier is to find a new supplier, and ‘voice’, where the customer’s response is to work
with the original supplier until the problem is corrected.
3 An extensive communication
system is necessary to facilitate the rich flow of information needed for the ‘let’s work
things out’ approach of the voice strategy. This information flow both requires and
engenders a high degree of commitment to the relationship. Commitment between a
customer and a supplier is important because, for example, a customer and a supplier can
reap substantial benefits from knowledge of each other’s products and processes gained by
working together over time. In contrast, an exit based strategy requires low commitment, so
as to maintain the credibility of the customer’s threat to leave and therefore information
exchange also must be low. Hence, commitment is important to overcome problems which
can arise in a supply relationship with a high level of specific investments, mutual
adjustment, and asymmetric information. It thus is an important safeguard for relational
continuity.
Commitment is partly based on trust and in turn generates trust. Trust is important
because transactions on the basis of trust, with its implicit, pre-existing and unspecified
conditions for cooperation, economize on the specification and monitoring of contracts and
material incentives for cooperation. This makes transactions not only cheaper but it also
makes for greater flexibility which is particularly important when the goal of cooperation is
innovation and learning (Nooteboom, 1996). Despite the fact that early research on
interorganizational exchange has recognized the importance of trust (e.g. Arrow, 1973), it is
only recently that the concept has been developed more rigorously. It is now accepted that
there are different forms of trust arising from various sources. Sako (1992) makes a
distinction between three types of trust: contractual, competence, and goodwill trust. The
latter refers to mutual expectations of open commitment to each other. With goodwill trust
there are no explicit promises which are expected to be fulfilled, as in the case of
contractual trust, nor fixed professional standards to be reached as in the case of
competence trust. Instead, someone who is worthy of goodwill trust is dependable and can
be endowed with high discretion, as he can be trusted to take initiatives while refraining
from unfair advantage taking. The three different forms of trust align with three different
theoretical perspectives on interorganizational exchange: transaction cost economics, the
competence perspective, and social exchange theory. Sako’s concept of goodwill concept
aligns with Nooteboom’s (1996) notion of intentional trust for which he identifies two
sources: institutions (norms, values) and habituation (habits, routines, style). Nooteboom
argues that intentional trust requires familiarity and mutual understanding. It thus depends
on time and context, on habit formation, and on the positive development of a relation.
Repeated interactions lead to the institutionalization of behavior and the forming of habits.
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3. Hypotheses
This section combines fifteen constructs into twenty-five hypotheses which together form a
model in terms of causal loops. The hypotheses are presented in five classes which
represent the main features of a supply relationship, and specify their direct (proximate)
causes and effects. The first two classes, asset specificity and uncertainty, are derived from
transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1985). The third, value of the partner, derives
from the competence perspective of the firm (Nooteboom, 1992a). The final two,
commitment and intentional trust, derive from the insights provided by the studies which
focus on the relational nature of supply relationships (Helper, 1987; Sako, 1992;
Nooteboom, 1996).
3.1 Asset Specificity
According to transaction cost economics, hold-up risk derives from dependencies as the
result of switching costs, which arise from specific assets. When a supplier makes a
dedicated investment, he creates dedicated assets, which increases its switching costs and
this will make him more dependent (cf. Heide and John, 1988). This yields hypothesis 1A.
The central concern of transaction cost economics is to construe safeguards against
the ‘hazards of opportunism’ (Williamson, 1985). The function of a safeguard in bilateral
exchange is to control or dampen the partner’s inclination and opportunity for opportunistic
behavior. Hence, a supplier will not make dedicated investments unless the resulting
dedicated assets can be safeguarded against the customer’s inclination and opportunity
towards opportunism. The principal safeguard suggested by transaction cost economics is
vertical integration. Other safeguards are contracts, shared ownership of dedicated assets,
guarantees by one of both firms in the form of guaranteed quantity, a price or a severance
payment, and the supply of ‘hostages’.
This study proposes additional safeguards. First, the perspective of ongoing future
exchange is needed to ensure that specific assets will be recouped. A second consideration
is derived from insights from non-cooperative game theory (cf. Parkhe, 1993; Heide and
Miner, 1992). In any two-person game, the individual’s choice for cooperation or defection
is determined by the pattern of the pay-offs and the length of the game. In most games,
unilateral defection is the dominant strategy in a single-play situation. However, Axelrod’s
(1984) computer tournaments have shown that with iterations the incidence of (mutual)
cooperation rises substantially. Reciprocal behavior, such as Tit-for-Tat strategies, may
induce cooperation because expected future interactions permit the players to reward and
punish each other. In particular, for cooperation to arise there must be uncertainty when the
game ends. Following this line of reasoning, a supplier will not make dedicated investments
unless there are future perspectives. This yields hypothesis 1B. Another safeguard derives6
from trust, but this operates through a reduction of behavioral uncertainty, and will
therefore be incorporated under that heading, in a later section.
A further determinant of dedicated investments comes from the competence
perspective where the value of the partner and available alternatives are core concepts. The
customer’s value to the supplier is defined as the skills, competencies, and capabilities the
customer can offer the supplier. The more important the customer is to the supplier, the
more incentives the supplier will have to invest in the relationship to make sure that the
relationship continues and it maintains access to the customer’s resources. This yields
hypothesis 1C.
The partner’s value, however, does not stand on its own. It is the customer’s excess
value, in comparison to alternatives available to the supplier, which determines its
importance. Such alternatives may have a dampening effect on the supplier’s inclination to
invest in the relationship. The more alternatives the supplier has for the customer, the
greater the probability that the supplier has a more attractive partner which will reduce the
supplier’s inclination for making dedicated investments, which would tie him to one of the
alternatives he has. This yields hypothesis 1D.
The hypotheses concerning direct causes and effects of specific assets are
summarized below.
H1A The supplier’s dedicated investments will have a positive effect on the supplier’s
dependence.
H1B The supplier’s future perspectives will have a positive effect on the supplier’s
dedicated investments.
H1C The customer’s value to the supplier will have a positive effect on the supplier’s
dedicated investments.
H1D The alternatives available to the supplier will have a negative effect on the supplier’s
dedicated investments.
3.2 Uncertainty
The second explanatory variable in Williamson’s (1985) framework is uncertainty.
Williamson argues that the combination of asset-specificity and uncertainty should lead to
vertical integration. Uncertainty has two dimensions in transaction cost economics, namely
environmental uncertainty – the firm’s inability to forecast accurately future changes in
circumstances surrounding the exchange – and behavioral uncertainty. Behavioral
uncertainty concerns the conduct of the transaction partners and includes the possibility of
opportunism. We take a wider definition of behavioral uncertainty to include
unpredictability in a firm’s future competencies as well. This study acknowledges the7
importance of both, and their interaction effect. It will relate them to the supplier’s
‘uncertainty avoidance’: the degree to which he will take measures to avoid uncertainty.
The motive to avoid uncertainty derives from the risks of uncertainty, in particular
hold-up risk. This risk is determined by the degree to which one is dependent, as a result of
dedicated investments, the degree of environmental uncertainty, which precludes closed
contracts, and the degree of behavioral uncertainty, which is the possibility that the partner
will be opportunistic or incompetent. These determinants of uncertainty avoidance yield
hypotheses 2A, 2B and 2C. One way of reducing the risk of hold-up is to reduce dedicated
investments, and thereby reduce dependence. Hence hypothesis 2D: uncertainty avoidance
has a negative effect on dedicated investments. Alternatively, one can try to reduce the
sources of uncertainty, especially behavioral uncertainty, but this operates indirectly, in a
causal loop through other variables, and will appear latter.
H2A Supplier’s dependence will have a positive effect on supplier’s uncertainty
avoidance.
H2B Supplier’s environmental uncertainty will have a positive effect on supplier’s
uncertainty avoidance.
H2C Supplier’s behavioral uncertainty will have a positive effect on supplier’s
uncertainty avoidance.
H2D Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance will have a negative effect on supplier’s dedicated
investments.
3.3 Value of the Partner
This study considers two strategies for the supplier which affect the supplier’s value to the
customer: providing information and making dedicated investments. First, when the
supplier makes dedicated investments these will be tailored to the specific needs of the
customer. These assets may be tangible, such as machinery and equipment developed to
provide the customer the product he desires, or intangible such as specific procedural or
working knowledge needed to develop the customer-tailored product. Often, tangible and
intangible dedicated assets will go together. Thus, when the supplier makes dedicated
investments the supplier will be better able to perform its tasks and therefore the supplier’s
value to the customer will increase.
Second, the supplier will also change its value to the customer by being more
open, i.e., by providing more information. A customer will benefit from a more open
supplier because this allows the customer to obtain more knowledge and thus develop its
competencies. Further, the exchange of information enables both partners to coordinate
their separate tasks and thus to increase efficiency and opportunities for cooperation. The8
automobile, for example, is a complex product for which mutual coordination on the both
sides of the interfirm dyad is required in order to produce a well-functioning vehicle (Dyer,
1996). Little coordination and thus cooperation will arise without openness. Hence, the
more information the supplier gives to the customer, the higher the supplier’s value to the
customer.
There is one important draw-back for the supplier of being more open to the
customer and that is the risk of spill-over effects: critical information concerning the
supplier’s own competitive advantage may diffuse, directly or indirectly, in a customer’s
network of contacts, to other suppliers which can be competitors (Nooteboom, 1997). The
supplier will not provide proprietary information to just any customer it encounters and
therefore we expect the value of the customer to have a positive effect on the supplier’s
openness. In other words, despite the risk of spill-over effects, the supplier will provide an
important customer with a lot of information because, as indicated above, such openness
allows to coordinate the separate tasks which makes sure that the relationship continues and
the supplier can benefit from the customer and the relationship in the future. Without
openness by the supplier, the customer cannot assess needs and opportunities for increasing
the supplier’s competencies.
H3A The supplier’s dedicated investments will have a positive effect on the supplier’s
value to the customer.
H3B The supplier’s openness will have a positive effect on the supplier’s value to the
customer.
H3C The customer’s value will have a positive effect on the supplier’s openness.
As discussed, transaction cost economics has a rather limited perspective on the ‘value of
the partner’. Nooteboom’s (1992a) generalized transaction cost theory, however, offers a
much wider definition of the value of the partner: beside efficiency value may include
many more dimensions such as developmental capacity, flexibility, adherence to
specifications, network position, value as a source of learning, international presence, and
continuity. It is the evaluation of these partner features next to available alternatives which
determines the partner’s value. For the customer, the supplier’s value contributes to the
customer’s switching costs because this is part of what the customer would loose if the
relationship ends. However, the more alternatives the customer has for the focal supplier,
the greater the probability that the customer will find a more attractive partner, which
decreases its dependence.9
H3D Supplier’s value to the customer will have a positive effect on customer’s
dependence.
H3E Alternatives available to the customer will have a negative effect on customer’s
dependence.
These two hypotheses also apply to customer’s value.
H3F Customer’s value to the supplier will have a positive effect on supplier’s
dependence.
H3G Alternatives available to the supplier will have a negative effect on supplier’s
dependence.
3.4 Commitment
This section will address a first antecedent and two consequences of the customer’s
commitment. The customer’s motivation for continuation of a supply relationship can come
from various sources. Here we focus on ‘calculative’ commitment; the following section
studies commitment on the basis of habituation and ‘affective’ commitment. According to
Geyskens et al. (1996), ‘calculative’ commitment refers to the channel member’s need to
maintain the relationship given the anticipated termination costs associated with leaving. As
discussed before, and in line with classical transaction cost economics. It is the result of the
calculation of costs and benefits, including an assessment of the investments made in the
relationship and the availability of alternatives to replace or make up for the foregone
investments. In a similar vein, Morgan and Hunt (1994) stress that the expected termination
costs lead to an ongoing relationship being viewed as important, thus generating
commitment to the relationship. Hence, the greater the customer’s dependence, the greater
the customer’s commitment.
The customer’s commitment refers to the customer’s efforts to work out problems
with the supplier instead of breaking the relationship and therefore it will contribute to the
customer’s value to the supplier. For example, a new supplier may present itself which
offers a similar product of equal quality but for a lower price than the customer’s current
supplier. As a response, a committed customer will offer its current supplier assistance – for
example, via specialized technical support teams – which helps the current supplier to
lower its price and to match the supplier’s competitor’s production performance.
Finally, the customer’s commitment is inevitably related to the supplier’s future
expectations of the relationship. The customer’s commitment is an indicator for the supplier
that the customer will not end the relationship in the short term. Therefore, the customer’s
commitment will increase the supplier’s future perspectives.10
H4A Customer’s dependence will have a positive effect on customer’s commitment.
H4B Customer’s commitment will have a positive effect on customer’s value to the
supplier.
H4C Customer’s commitment will have a positive effect on supplier’s future perspectives.
3.5 Intentional Trust: Habituation
This section focuses on the second, non-calculative dimension of commitment namely
intentional trust on the basis of habits and affect. Intentional trust requires familiarity and
mutual understanding and thus depends on time and context, i.e., on habituation.
Habituation refers to familiarization, habit formation, and bonding which is generated by
positive experience and frequent interactions (Nooteboom, 1996). Nooteboom et al. (1997)
measured habituation, and found it to have a significant negative effect on perceived
relational risk, next to other variables that one would expect from transaction cost theory.
Past duration of the relationship is a necessary condition for habituation because
only repeated interactions lead to the forming of habits. Moreover, a longer past duration
will increase habituation because if it had had negative effects their accumulation
presumably would have led to a break in the relationship. Parkhe (1993) concludes that the
older the relationship, the greater the likelihood it has passed through a critical shakeout
period of conflict. In a similar vein, Anderson and Weitz (1989) demonstrate that trust
increases as the relationship matures. Gulati (1995) finds that having prior relationships
makes firms less likely to choose equity as a governance mechanism in R&D based
alliances. Thus, habituation emerges from prior contact and is based on the premise that
through ongoing interactions, firms learn about each other and develop trust around norms
of equity (cf. Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).
Habituation will increase the expected continuation of the relationship. Expectations
of continuation increase as the relationship matures (Anderson and Weitz, 1989). With
habituation, the customer and the supplier will have corrected short-term inequities and thus
develop confidence that the relationship will continue into the future. Substantive and
intensive discussions will lead to better informed parties and prevent misunderstandings to
arise which in turn will make each party more confident of continuation of the relationship.
Experience is not only positive: quarrels and perceptions of opportunism are likely to have
occurred, but even these contribute to increased knowledge and reduced uncertainty and
habit formation, while excessive and unsolved problems of opportunism would have led to
a break-up.
H5A Past duration will have a positive effect on habituation.
H5B Habituation will have a positive effect on supplier’s future perspectives.11
Another expected benefit of habituation is that it will increase customer’s
commitment. Previous empirical research on the relationship between trust and
commitment show that trust is a determinant of commitment (e.g. Moorman et al., 1993;
Achrol, 1991). Morgan and Hunt (1994) maintain that this causal relationship can be
explained through the principle of generalized reciprocity: mistrust breeds mistrust and as
such would also serve to decrease commitment in the relationship and shift the transaction
to one or more direct short-term exchanges. In a similar vein, Geyskens et al. (1996)
provide arguments to separate ‘calculatively’ motivated commitment from ‘affectively’
motivated commitment. By ‘affectively’ motivated commitment the underlying motive to
maintain a relationship is ‘a generalized sense of positive regard for, and attachment to, the
organization.’ Hence, an ‘affectively’ committed partner desires to continue the relationship
because it likes the partner and enjoys the relationship. Following this line of reasoning,
habituation is expected to increase the customer’s commitment because with habituation
positive feelings towards the partner are established.
A third expected benefit of habituation is that it will decrease supplier’s behavioral
uncertainty. A key-feature of habituation is frequent interactions which make behavior
more transparent (cf. Parkhe, 1993). Habituation is a form of interorganizational learning
by which intentional trust is built. With habituation, the danger for the supplier to be
engaged with an opportunistically inclined customer with negative tactics or coercion will
be lower. It allows the supplier to learn about the customer’s fairness in, for example,
pricing policies, and to learn specific contractual restrictions or responsibilities, the
customer’s technical competencies and production plan schedules.
A fourth expected benefit of habituation is that it will make the supplier more open
to the customer. Trust will cause communication and the exchange of information (Helper,
1987; Dwyer et al., 1987). Habituation fosters the continuation of the relationship and
increases behavioral transparency and thus it will increase the supplier’s motivation to
commit to the relationship characterized by a more open sharing of information.
H5C Habituation will have a positive effect on customer’s commitment.
H5D Habituation will have a negative effect on supplier’s behavioral uncertainty.
H5E Habituation will have a positive effect on supplier’s openness.
Beside the expected beneficial effects, habituation is posited to have costs as well.
Habituation represents an investment in the relationship – time and effort to develop a
working relationship – which the supplier and the customer make. It is a form of mutual
idiosyncratic investments which directly will increase both partner’s dependence.
Transaction specific assets of a human nature in the form of specialized purpose knowledge12
and a working relationship are created which arise in a learning by doing fashion and create
special rather than general capital (cf. Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995). Habituation
incorporates the transfer of information. With more habituation, the stock of information
regarding the predictability of the partner is increased. Frequent dealing with an exchange
partner when the product is complex, will result in transaction specific routines which
cannot be transferred easily to another partner. Thus, with habituation experience-based
assets or relation-specific know-how will accumulate over time and this will increase the
switching costs and thus the dependence of both partners.
H5F Habituation will have a positive effect on the supplier’s dependence.
H5G Habituation will have a positive effect on the customer’s dependence.
The fifteen variables and twenty-five hypotheses are summarized in figure 1.13
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The contribution of this study is to unravel causal loops and interactions between different
variables that characterize cooperative relationships. LISREL is an appropriate method to
estimate such causal loops.
4.1 Data Collection
This study applies data on supply relationships which were collected via a survey in the
United States by professor Helper. The survey was part of and financially sponsored by the
International Motor Vehicle Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT,
Cambridge, United States). In spring 1993, the survey was mailed to every automotive
supplier and automaker division mentioned in the Elm guide to Automotive Sourcing. This
guide lists the major first-tier suppliers – both domestic and foreign owned – to
manufacturers of cars and light trucks in the United States and Canada. The target
respondents were the divisional directors of marketing at independent firms and the
divisional business managers or directors of strategic planning at car manufacturer
components divisions. These respondents were selected on the grounds that they would
have the broadest knowledge about both customer relationships as well as their firms’
products and processes. Because many companies supply their customer with several
different types of products, and their relationship with their customer differ by product, the
respondents were asked to answer the survey for their most important or significant
customer regarding one product which was typical of their company’s output. The
respondents had a wealth of experience. On average they had worked for more than 18
years in the auto industry and more than 11 years in their companies. The response rate of
the survey was 55 per cent after accounting for those firms which were unreachable, i.e.,
mail sent to them was returned undelivered, and those which were not eligible to answer the
survey, i.e., they were not first-tier automotive suppliers or they specialized in supplying for
heavy trucks and buses. It provided detailed information about 665 supply relationships.
4.2 Measurement Models: Factor Analyses
The theoretical model of this paper incorporates nine latent variables which were each
measured by more than one item. The remaining six items were measured by one indicator
and therefore did not have to be analyzed with a factor analysis. Appendix A supplies all
the details on constructs, items and scales. An exploratory and a confirmatory factor
analysis (henceforward EFA and CFA) were performed for each of the nine latent
variables. EFA – principal component analysis with varimax rotation calculated with SPSS
7.5 – helped identifying whether or not items clustered on a factor with a factor-loading of
.30 as the usual cut-off point. Further the standardized values of the Cronbach’s alpha were15
computed, for which .50 is used as the threshold value. Afterwards, PRELIS 2.14 and
LISREL 8.14 were used for the CFA (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993; 1996). The former
calculated the (polychoric) correlation matrix for each of the nine measurement models.
The latter offered maximum likelihood estimates of the relationship between one indicator
and the latent construct, lij, and the significance of lij, for which the threshold value is that
the t-values must be at least 2.
The selected items for seven latent variables – supplier’s dependence, customer’s
dependence, supplier’s uncertainty avoidance, supplier’s environmental uncertainty,
customer’s value, habituation, and customer’s commitment – exceeded the various criteria
for the EFA and CFA. For the constructs supplier’s behavioral uncertainty and supplier’s
value to the customer, the EFA resulted in more than one dimension. Table 1 presents the
EFA-results for supplier’s behavioral uncertainty.













The first factor is operationalized by the items SBU5 through SBU7 and measures
the supplier’s perception of the customer’s opportunism. This aligns with Williamson’s
(1985) interpretation of behavioral uncertainty. The Cronbach’s alpha of .77 for these three
items is high. The second factor is operationalized by the items SBU1 through SBU4 and
measures the customer’s unpredictability in terms of his competencies. The Cronbach’s
alpha of .70 for these four items is very satisfactory. This outcome provides a clear
confirmation of the distinction between competence trust and goodwill trust. The results of
the EFA were used for a second-order CFA which showed that the two latent constructs
‘opportunism’ and ‘competencies’ were highly significantly related to the original construct
supplier’s behavioral uncertainty.16
Table 2 below presents the EFA-results for the supplier’s value to the customer.
These results show three factors which have a clear interpretation namely the supplier’s
value in terms of the supplier’s relative skills (factor 1), innovative capabilities (factor 2),
and technical competencies (factor 3).










SV1 .72 .32 -.03
SV2 .84 -.05 .12
SV3 .87 .05 .06
SV4 .01 .09 .62
SV5 .12 .04 .75
SV6 .02 .01 .69
SV7 -.04 .78 .02
SV8 .21 .56 .10
SV9 .06 .75 .06
Alpha .76 .52 .46
The items SV4, SV5, and SV6 have a Cronbach’s alpha of .46 which is slightly
below the threshold value of .50. Nevertheless, the factor-loadings of these items are far
above the cut-off point of .30 and therefore we continued the analyses with these items.
Again, a second-order CFA was performed following the results of the EFA which showed
that the three separate dimensions were highly significantly related to the original construct
‘supplier’s value to the customer’.
4.3 Structural Model: Testing the Hypotheses
A LISREL application is restricted by the size of the sample. Lawley and Maxwell (1971)
recommend a minimum sample of 50 cases greater than half the number of measured
variables times one plus the number of variables – k (k+1) / 2 + 50 – for an analysis using
maximum likelihood estimation. Others have suggested to use at least 20 observations for
every observed variable included in the model with a minimum sample size of 100 cases.
Since this study measured 43 variables roughly 950 to 1000 cases would have been
desirable. For this, the sample size of 665 cases was not large enough. As a solution to this17
problem, we measured each of the nine latent variables by the additive scale of the specific
items (cf. Steenkamp et al., 1991; Bollen and Lenox, 1991; Baumgarten and Homburg,
1996). The remaining six variables were measured by a single indicator. This resulted in a
structural model with 15 measured variables and a required sample size of about 200 cases.
PRELIS 2.14 was used to calculate the appropriate product-moment input matrix
of the 15 variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993; 1996). Many but not all of the 15 variables
had a interval measurement scale. Therefore, a covariance matrix could not be calculated.
The correlation matrix presented in appendix B contains Pearson as well as polychoric and
polyserial correlation coefficients. These correlations served as the input matrix for
LISREL 8.14 and the standardized parameter-estimates were obtained with the maximum
likelihood procedure. A hypothesis is confirmed if it equals the sign of the parameter-
estimate and if it is significant. One-tailed significance levels are used because the
hypotheses formulate the explicit predictions of the effect of a variable. A t-value larger
than 1.282 aligns with p<.10 (weakly significant), a t-value larger than 1.645 with p<.05
(moderately significant) and a t-value larger than 2.326 with p<.01 (strongly significant).
PRELIS 2.14 treats any variable with 15 categories or more as an interval-scaled
variable. This is a default setting which can be changed. We used this option to calculate a
Pearson correlation matrix and a covariance matrix of the 15 variables. Subsequently, these
two matrices were used as a sensitivity analysis with LISREL 8.14 ML-estimates. With
very minor deviations the resulting parameter-estimates, t-values, and global-fit values
were identical to the ones presented in section 4.4.
LISREL computes many indicators which can be used for the evaluation of the
global model fit (Boomsma, 1996). This study used four of the most common indicators for
the evaluation of the global model fit of the structural model (Marsh et al., 1988). The chi-
square indicates the probability that the measurement matrix of the form implied by the
model. It is a test statistic and a p-value greater than .05 is generally considered to be
acceptable. The goodness-of-fit index (GFI) measures the relative amounts of variance and
covariance in a sample covariance matrix that the model predicts. The adjusted goodness-
of-fit index (AGFI) is an extension of the GFI, i.e., adjusted for the degrees of freedom of
the model relative to the number of variables. For both, a value greater than .90 is
considered an indication of good fit (Mathieu et al., 1992). The root mean square error of
approximation index (RMSEA) takes into account the error of approximation in the
population and the precision of the fit measure itself. Browne and Cudeck (1993) suggest
that values lower than .05 indicate a ‘very good’ fit; a value from .05 to .08 indicates a ‘fair
to mediocre’ fit; a value from .08 to .10 indicates a ‘poor’ fit; and values greater than .10 a
‘very bad’ fit.18
To summarize, first PRELIS 2.14 was used to calculate the appropriate correlation
matrix of the fifteen variables (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1993, 1996). Second, the maximum
likelihood estimation procedure of LISREL 8.14 was used to obtain estimates of the
parameters, related t-values, and global model-fit indices of the theoretical model. The
obtained parameter estimates were standardized. Finally, lack of local model fit was studied
and information provided by LISREL 8.14 was used to improve this. In other words, after
testing hypotheses – represented by lines in the causal structure – allowance was made for
induction: additional causal lines that would improve the fit.
4.4 Results
Initial Results
The initial results, from the tests of the hypotheses, showed that almost all hypotheses were
strongly confirmed by the data (see figure 2).19











































































Notes: (1) * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p <.01.20
The overall model-fit of this theoretical model M0 was assessed by means of four
indicators (see table 3 below). The overall model-fit of M0 was reasonable. The value of the
goodness-of-fit index (GFI) is satisfactory since it exceeds the common threshold value of
.90. The value of the adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) is slightly below this threshold
value. The value of the chi-square is non-significant. Partly this can be explained by the fact
that four variables had a non-normal distribution, i.e., a skewness and kurtosis larger than 2.
Maximum likelihood over-estimates the value of the chi-square in such a case (Boomsma,
1992). Further, the chi-square is sensitive to sample size: ‘large’ samples will result in a
‘bad’ fit and ‘small’ samples in a ‘good’ fit. Our sample size of 665 observations is
relatively ‘large’. Jöreskog and Sörbom (1993) therefore suggest to use this indicator
mainly in the process of model-modification. The value of the root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA) is just below .10 which indicates a ‘poor’ although not a ‘very
bad’ fit. However, the fact that most of the effects measured in the model were strongly
confirmed and in accordance with the hypotheses does yield confidence in the validity of
the hypotheses.
Modifications
LISREL 8.14 presents a modification index for each fixed parameter in the model, i.e., for
every path that is ‘missing’ in the path-diagram. For each such path, the modification index
is an estimate of the decrease in chi-square that will be obtained if that particular path is
introduced in the model while all other paths remain unchanged. The expected change
parameter provides an estimate of the sign and size of the new path in the model. Following
this information provided by LISREL 8.14 this study introduced three changes in the
theoretical model. The resulting changes in the global model-fit indices are presented in
table 3. During this sequential process the model appeared to be very robust, i.e., neither the
signs of the path coefficients nor their significance levels changed.




M0 541.7 .098 .907 .849
M1 378.9 .079 .933 .891
M2 313.0 .071 .944 .907
M3 259.3 .062 .953 .92221
With respect to model M0, the first and largest modification index suggested to
add a path from customer’s commitment to supplier’s behavioral uncertainty with an
expected negative effect. The original model hypothesized that habituation – which is one
of the sources of intentional trust – would decrease supplier’s behavioral uncertainty but
this direct effect did not come out as significant. A direct effect of the customer’s
commitment on supplier’s behavioral uncertainty has a clear theoretical interpretation.
Commitment refers to the customer’s efforts at continuing the relationship. Once
committed, the customer’s behavior will have become less unpredictable. Further, figure 2
shows that habituation increases customer’s commitment. Therefore, habituation will still
have an effect on the supplier’s behavioral uncertainty but indirectly via customer’s
commitment. In fact, this inductively established result makes more sense than the original
hypothesis: it is indirectly, through commitment, that habituation helped to reduce
behavioral uncertainty.
The theoretical model M0 was modified by removing the non-significant path from
habituation to the supplier’s behavioral uncertainty and by adding the new path from the
customer’s commitment to the supplier’s behavioral uncertainty. This resulted in model M1.
Table 3 shows that the overall model-fit of model M1 in comparison to model M0 increased
significantly: the values of the Chi-square and the RMSEA decreased and the values of the
GFI and AGFI increased.
Next, with respect to model M1, the largest modification index suggested to add a
path from the customer’s dependence to the supplier’s dependence with an expected
positive effect. This is a new path which was not thought of a priori when formulating the
hypotheses. It suggests a direct relationship between both partner’s dependence apart from
all other effects we already have incorporated. To some extent this is plausible from an
exchange paradigm: as firms join forces to achieve mutually beneficial goals they
acknowledge that each is dependent on the other. Interdependence results from a
relationship in which both firms perceive mutual benefits from interacting and in which any
loss of autonomy will be equitably compensated through the expected gains (Kumar et al.,
1995).
However, the outcome may also be the result of omitted variables, as indicated by
the less from perfect overall model-fit. For example, contracts – which is a safeguard
suggested by transaction cost economics in case of dedicated investments – are not included
in this study simply because no indicators for it are available in the data. We modified
model M1 by adding the path from the customer’s dependence to the supplier’s dependence
which resulted in model M2. Again, table 3 shows that the overall model-fit of the model
M2 in comparison to model M1 – and the benchmark theoretical model M0 – strongly
increased.22
Finally, with respect to model M2, LISREL suggested to add a path from
supplier’s environmental uncertainty to supplier’s behavioral uncertainty with an expected
positive effect. This study hypothesized environmental uncertainty to have a direct positive
effect on the supplier’s uncertainty avoidance but this relationship was not significant. An
effect of environmental uncertainty on behavioral uncertainty does have a clear theoretical
interpretation. A firm in a rapidly changing environment will have more opportunities for
opportunistic behavior and will be less predictable in terms of its competence capabilities.
Further, figure 2 shows that behavioral uncertainty increases supplier’s uncertainty
avoidance. Therefore, environmental uncertainty still has an effect on uncertainty
avoidance but indirectly via behavioral uncertainty. Again this makes more sense than the
original hypotheses: environmental uncertainty only matters to the extent that it engenders
behavioral uncertainty; without behavioral uncertainty environmental uncertainty does not
matter. The model M2 was modified by removing the non-significant path from
environmental uncertainty to uncertainty avoidance and by adding the path from
environmental uncertainty to behavioral uncertainty. This resulted in the final model M3.
Table 3 shows that the overall model-fit of the model M3 in comparison to model M2 – and
the benchmark theoretical model M0 – increased.
The estimates of the path-coefficients and significance levels of the final model
M3 are presented in figure 3.23
















































































Notes: (1) p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p <.01. (2) The solid lines indicate the original hypotheses
and the dotted lines represent the new paths.24
Figure 3 shows that seventeen of the original hypotheses are strongly confirmed
by the data. Further, two original hypotheses are moderately confirmed: alternatives
available to the customer has the expected negative effect on customer’s dependence and
habituation has the expected positive effect on customer’s commitment. The t-values of
these two paths were larger than 2 but lower than 2.326.
One original hypothesis – the supplier’s future perspectives has a positive effect
on the supplier’s dedicated investments – only received weak support but the effect is still
significant. The explanation for this low significance may be the non-normal distribution of
the variable ‘supplier’s future perspectives’. If a variable does not have a normal
distribution, maximum likelihood tends to overestimate the standard error and thus to
underestimate the t-value because the t-value it the ratio of the parameter estimate and the
estimate of its standard error (Boomsma, 1992). Further, one original hypothesis did not
receive any significant support. The customer’s value to the supplier does have the
expected positive effect on supplier’s dependence but it is non-significant.
A moderately positive effect exists for the number of alternatives to the supplier
on the supplier’s dedicated investments. This contradicts the original hypothesis but has a
clear interpretation: with more alternative customers the supplier will be less dependent –
and thus will have less risks of hold-up – and therefore be more willing to make dedicated
investments. Alternatives available to the supplier does have the expected negative sign but
this effect was found non-significant. The variable ‘alternatives to the supplier’ was one of
the four variables with a non-normal distribution which again may provide an explanation
for the lack of significance.
Finally, the supplier’s environmental uncertainty increases the supplier’s
behavioral uncertainty which is decreased by the customer’s commitment and the
customer’s dependence increases the supplier’s dependence.
5. Discussion
Theory
This paper analyzes the long-term nature of supply relationships. It builds on transaction
cost economics (Williamson, 1985). Recent studies on interorganizational exchange,
however, have argued that the transaction cost explanation for various forms of ongoing
interorganizational exchange is limited and therefore it needs to be extended (e.g.
Nooteboom, 1996; Nooteboom et al., 1997; Gulati, 1995; Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995).
In line with these, this study builds on the competence perspective as developed by
Nooteboom (1992a) and on studies which focused on the relational nature of
interganizational exchange (Helper, 1987; Sako, 1992; Nooteboom, 1996). The theoretical25
model of this study takes into account the risks involved in a long-term supply relationship,
but also allows for the building of competencies, commitment and trust.
Long-term supply relationships are characterized by causal loops and interactions
between many different variables. All variables – firm- and relation-specific characteristics
such as dependence and habituation – identified in the causal structure of figure 1 have an
influence on at least one other variable and in turn are being affected by often more than
one variable. Hence, many variables are dependent as well as independent variables at the
same time. The contribution of this study is that, by means of twenty-five hypotheses and
which combine fifteen different constructs, it has unraveled causal loops and interactions
between variables that characterize cooperative relationships.
Causal Loops
The theoretical model is tested with data on supply relationships in the automobile industry
of the United States. These empirical results, which in final form are presented in figure 3,
strongly confirm almost all of the hypotheses that underlie the causal loops in long-term,
cooperative relationships. In particular the following loops of causality can be identified.
When the supplier makes a dedicated investment its dependence increases (H1A)
but also his value to the customer (H3A). The latter makes the customer more dependent
(H3D) and thereby increases his commitment (H4A). From here, the feedback loop can go
three ways. First, customer commitment increases his value to the supplier (H4B) which
allows for more supplier’s dedicated investments (H1C). Second, customer commitment
enlarges the supplier’s future perspectives (H4C) which also allows for more dedicated
investments (H1B). Third, the model tells us inductively that it is customer commitment
instead of habituation that reduces supplier’s behavioral uncertainty and thereby reduces the
need for risk avoidance (H2C), which allows for more specific investments (H2D).
The study also confirms the importance of habituation – the source of intentional
trust – as a catalyst to the loops of causality mentioned above. Past duration yields
habituation (H5A) which creates bilateral dependence (H5F and H5G). Further, it directly
enlarges ‘the shadow of the future’ (H5B), customer commitment (H5C), and supplier
openness (H5E).
Limitations and Further Research
This study has limitations which present opportunities for further research. First, there is a
need to test the external validity of the theoretical model with other sets of data preferably
with data which refer to supply relationships in another country such as Japan. Cross-
validation allows for a second test of the theoretical model and of the few inductively found
paths. It also provides an opportunity to study international differences in the long-term26
nature of supply relationships. The obtained results presented in this paper refer to supply
relationships in the United States and interestingly seem to confirm that US firms are
indeed developing long-term supply relationships. Recently, there is also some evidence
that Japanese firms are changing their relationships in the reversed direction i.e. away from
long-term relationships towards more short-term relations (Helper and Levine, 1992).
Second, LISREL indicated a direct link between customer and supplier
dependence which has a theoretical interpretation but also seems to be indicating that there
might be missing variables or there might be missing links i.e. in addition to the
mechanisms of mutual dependence allowed in the model there were more. Further research
should investigate this issue for example by adding more loops to the model and in an
experimental setting analyze whether or not this results still appears.
Finally, what are the implications of causal loops? They indicate that many
characteristics of relations determine others and are in turn determined by them. But what is
the timing involved? A model with causal loops is a basis for a dynamic study of the
evolution of relations in time, and a proof of its need. In order to proceed, we may need to
conduct longitudinal studies, in which the sequencing of effects is studied explicitly, and
implications are tested for the development and the management of relations in time. Such a
longitudinal study may be empirical, or it may entail the setting up of a simulation model to
reproduce relational dynamics. For both, the results from the present study may provide the
basis for the specification of hypotheses viz. the structure of the simulation logic.27
References
Achrol, R. (1991), Evolution of the Market Organization: New Forms for Turbulent
Environments, Journal of Marketing 55 , 77-93.
Anderson, E. and Weitz, B. (1989), Determinants of Continuity in Conventional Industrial
Channel Dyads, Marketing Science 8, 310-323.
Arrow, K.A. (1973), Information and Economic Behavior, Stockholm, Federation of
Swedish Industries.
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation, New York, Basic Books.
Baumgarten, H. and Homburg, C. (1996), Applications of Structural Equation Modeling in
Marketing and Consumer Research: A Review, International Journal of Research in
Marketing 13, 139-161.
Berger, J., Noorderhaven, N.G., and Nooteboom, B. (1995), The Determinants of Supplier
Dependence: An Empirical Study, pp. 195-212 in J. Groenewegen, C. Pitelis, and S.E.
Sjörstrand (Eds.), On Economic Institutions: Theory and Applications, Aldershot:
Edward Elgar.
Bollen, K. and Lenox, R. (1991), Conventional Wisdom in Measurement: A Structural
Equation Perspective, Psychological Bulletin 110, 305-314.
Boomsma, A. (1992), On the Use of Normal Scores for Ordinal and Censored Variables in
PRELIS: A Expository Note, Kwantitatieve Methoden 41, 19-45.
Boomsma, A. (1996), The Adequatness of Covariance Structural Models: An Overview of
Measures and Indices, Kwantitatieve Methode 52, 7-52.
Browne, M.W. and R. Cudeck (1992), Alternative Ways of Assessing Model Fit,
Sociological Methods and Research 21, 230-258.
Coase, R. (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica N.S. 4, 386-405.
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1990), Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation, Administrative Science Quarterly 35, 128-152.
Cusumano, M.A. (1985), The Japanese Automobile Industry, Council on East Asian
Studies, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
De Jong, G., Nooteboom, B., and Vossen, R.W. (1997), The Effects of Firm- and Relation-
Specific Characteristics on Quality of Supplier Relationships, pp. 61-84 in P.B.
Boorsma, K. Aarts, and A.E. Steenge (Eds.), Public Priority Setting: Rules and Costs,
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Press.
Dwyer, R.F., Schurr, P., and Oh, S. (1987), Developing Buyer-Supplier Relationships,
Journal of Marketing 51, 11-27.
Dyer, J.H. (1996), Specialized Supplier Networks as source of Competitive Advantage:
Evidence from the Auto Industry, Strategic Management Journal 17, 271-291.28
Dyer, J.H. and Ouchi, W.G. (1993), Japanese-Style Partnerships: Giving Companies a
Competitive Edge, Sloan Management Review, 51-63.
Foss, N.J., and Knudsen, C. (1996), Towards a Competence Perspective of the Firm,
London, Routledge.
Fuss, M.A., and Waverman, L. (1992), Costs and Productivity in Automobile Production,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ganesan, S. (1994), Determinants of Long-Term Orientation in Buyer-Seller Relationships,
Journal of Marketing 58, 1-19.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.E.M., Scheer, L.K., and Kumar, N. (1996), The Effects of Trust
and Interdependence on Relationship Commitment: A Trans-Atlantic Study,
International Journal of Research in Marketing 13, 303-317.
Gulati, R. (1995), Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for
Contractual Choice in Alliances, Academy of Management Journal 38, 85-112.
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1988), The Role of Dependence-Balancing in Safeguarding
Transaction-Specific Assets in Conventional Channels, Journal of Marketing 52, 20-35.
Heide, J.B. and Miner, A.S. (1992), The Shadow of the future: Effects of Anticipated
Interaction and Frequency of Contact on Buyer-Seller Cooperation, Academy of
Management Journal 35 (2), 265-291.
Helper, S. (1987), Supplier Relationships and Innovation: Theory and Application to the
U.S. Auto Industry, Ph.D. Thesis, Harvard University.
Helper, S. (1990), Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto
Industries: an Exit/Voice Approach, Business and Economic History 19, 1-10.
Helper, S. (1991), How Much Has Really Changed Between U.S. Automakers and Their
Suppliers?, Sloan Management Review, 15-28.
Helper, S. (1994), Three Steps Forward, Two Steps Back in the Automotive Supplier
Relations, Technovation 14 (10), 663-640.
Helper, S. and Levine, D. (1992), Long-Term Supplier Relations and Product-Market
Structure, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8, 561-581.
Helper, S. and Sako, M. (1995), Supplier Relationships in Japan and the United States: Are
They Converging?, Sloan Management Review 36, 77-84.
Hirschman, A. (1970), Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press.
Jöreskog, K. and Sörbom, D. (1993), LISREL 8: Structural Equation Modeling with the
SIMPLIS Command Language, Chicago, Scientific Software International.
Jöreskog, K. and Sörbom, D. (1996), PRELIS 2: User’s Reference Guide, Chicago,
Scientific Software International.
Kalwani, M.U. and Narayandus, N. (1995), Long-Term Manufacturer-Supplier
Relationships Do They Pay Off for Supplier Firms?, Journal of Marketing 59, 1-16.29
Kumar, N., Scheer, L.K., and Steenkamp, J.E.M. (1995), The Effects of Perceived
Interdependence on Dealer Attitudes, Journal of Marketing Research 32, 348-356.
Lawley, D.N. and Maxwell, A.E. (1971), Factor Analysis as a Statistical Method 2
nd
Edition, London, Butterworth.
Marsh, H.W., Balla, J.R., and McDonald, R.P (1988), Goodness-of-Fit Index in
Confirmatory Analysis: The Effect of Sample Size, Psychological Bulletin 103, 391-
410.
Martin, A., Mitchell, W. and Swaminathan, A. (1995), Recreating and Extending Japanese
Automobile Buyer-Supplier Links in North America, Strategic Management Journal
16, 589-691.
Mathieu, J.E., S.I. Tannenbaum, and E. Sales (1992), Influences of Individual and
Situational Characteristics on Measures of Training Effectiveness, Academy of
Management Journal 35, 828-847.
Moorman, C., Zaltman, G., and Deshpandé, R. (1993), Relationships Between Providers
and Users of Marketing Research,: the Dynamics of Trust Within and Between
Organizations, Journal of Marketing Research 29, 314-329.
Morgan, R.M. and Hunt, S.D. (1994), The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship
Marketing, Journal of Marketing 58, 20-38.
Nishiguchi, T (1994), Strategic Industrial Sourcing. The Japanese Advantage, Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Nooteboom, B. (1992a), Towards a Dynamic Theory of Transactions, Journal of
Evolutionairy Economics 2, 281-299.
Nooteboom, B. (1992b), Information Technology, Transaction Costs and the Decision to
‘Make or Buy’, Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 4, 339-350.
Nooteboom, B. (1993a), Firm Size Effects on Transaction Costs, Small Business
Economics 5, 283-295.
Nooteboom, B. (1993b), Transactions and Networks: Do They Connect? pp. 9-26 in J.
Groenewegen (ed.) Dynamics of the Firm: Strategies of Pricing and Organization,
Aldershot, Edward Elgar.
Nooteboom, B. (1993c), An Analysis of Specificity in Transaction Cost Economics,
Organization Studies 14, 443-451.
Nooteboom, B. (1996), Trust, Opportunism and Governance: a Process and Control Model,
Organization Studies 17, 985-1010.
Nooteboom, B. (1997), Cost, Quality and Learning Based Governance of Buyer-Supplier
Relations, in M.G. Colombo (ed.), The Changing Boundaries of the Firm, London,
Routledge.30
Nooteboom, B., Berger, H., and Noorderhaven, N.G., (1997), Effects of Trust and
Governance on Relational Risk, Academy of Management Journal 40, 308-338.
Parkhe, A. (1993), Strategic Alliance Structuring: A Game Theoretic and Transaction Cost
Examination of Interfirm Cooperation, Academy of Management Journal 36, 794-829.
Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Ring, P.S. and Van de Ven, A.H. (1994), Developmental Processes of Cooperative
Interorganizational Relationships, Academy of Management Review 19, 90-118
Sako, M. (1992), Prices, Quality, and Trust: Inter-Firm Relations in Britain and Japan,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Steenkamp, J.B. and Van Trijp, H.C.M. (1991), The use of LISREL in validating marketing
constructs, International Journal of Marketing 8, 283-299.
Williamson, O.E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications,
New York, Free Press.
Williamson, O.E. (1985), Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, Free Press.
Williamson., O.E. (1993), Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization, Journal of
Law and Economics 36, 453-486.
Zaheer, A. and Venkatraman, N. (1995), Relational Governance as an Interorganizational
Strategy: and Empirical Test of the Role of Trust in Economic Exchange, Strategic
Management Journal 16, 373-392.31
Appendix A Constructs, Items, and Scales
01 Supplier’s dedicated investments SUPINV
Please estimate the total amount of your business unit’s investment in equipment to make
this product over the last four years.
02 Supplier’s dependence SUPDEP
SD1 If you were to stop getting these orders from this customer, approximately how much of
your investment for this product in plant, equipment, and training would you be unlikely
to find alternative uses for and have to write off?
Scale: 1 = 10% or less; 2 = 11-33%; 3 = 34-66%; 4 = 67-89%; 5 = 90-100%.
SD2 Please estimate the technical complexity involved in manufacturing the product in 1992.
Scale: 1 = fairly simple; 5 = highly complex.
SD3 Please check the appropriate range for the average piece price of the product in 1992.
  Scale: for the United States 1 = <$1; 2 = $1-10; 3 = $11-50; 4 = $51-100; 5 = > $100.
SD4 Does your business unit have any of the following?
A marketing office near your customer; a design office near your customer; a facility
near your customer to consolidate shipments of your parts for ‘Just-in-Time’ (JIT)
delivery; an engineers resident at your customer's facility.
Scale: one point for each.
03 Customer’s Dependence CUSDEP
CD1 Please estimate the number of months it would take your customer to replace your
business unit with another supplier. Consider the time required to locate, qualify, train,
make investments, test, and develop a working relationship with another firm. Please
exclude legal considerations such as the existence of long-term contracts.
Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-3; 3 = 4-12; 4 = 13-24; 5 = 25-48; 6 = > 48.
CD2 What percent of your business unit’s sales ends up as original equipment for cars or light
trucks?
Scale: 1 = 0-10; 2 = 11-25; 3 = 26-40; 4 = 41-65; 5 = 66-80; 6 = 81-100.
04 Supplier’s uncertainty avoidance SUPUNC
SUA1 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this product, we
would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and training which could be
used to serve only this customer.
SUA2 If our customer had given us less assurance of continued business for this product, we
would definitely have invested less in plant, equipment, and training which could be
used to serve either this customer or other customers.
Both Scales: 1 = strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree.32
05 Supplier’s environmental uncertainty SUPENV
SEU1 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding your
production costs over 4 years.
SEU2 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding the production
technology for this product over 4 years.
Both Scales: 1 = fairly certain; 5 = completely unpredictable.
06 Supplier’s behavioral uncertainty BEHUNC
SBU1 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding the customer’s
production schedule 2 weeks ahead.
Scale: 1 = fairly certain; 5 = completely unpredictable.
SBU2 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding the customer’s
production schedule 1 year ahead.
Scale: 1 = fairly certain; 5 = completely unpredictable.
SBU3 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding the customer’s
final product specifications before job 1.
Scale: 1 = fairly certain; 5 = completely unpredictable.
SBU4 In the production of this product, how much certainty is there regarding the customer’s
final product specifications after job 1.
Scale: 1 = fairly certain; 5 = completely unpredictable.
SBU5  Given the chance, our customer might try to take unfair advantage of our business unit.
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree.
SBU6  We feel that our customer often uses the information we give to check up on us, rather
than to solve problems.
Scale: 1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree.
SBU7 Please circle the number which best describes your belief that your customer will
treat you fairly.
Scale: 1 = customer always treats us fairly; 5 = can’t depend on customer to treat us
fairly.
07 Supplier’s value to the customer SUPVAL
SV1 For design engineering. Currently, how would you rate your business unit's skills at
making modifications to products or processes? Please compare yourself to other firms in
your industry throughout the world.
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average.
SV2 For making incremental process improvements. Currently, how would you rate your
business unit's skills at making modifications to products or processes? Please compare
yourself to other firms in your industry throughout the world.
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average.33
SV3 For implementing entirely new processes. Currently, how would you rate your business
unit's skills at making modifications to products or processes? Please compare yourself to
other firms in your industry throughout the world.
Scale: 1 = significantly below average; 5 = significantly above average.
SV4 Of the metal cutting machines currently in use at the plant which makes this product,
about what percent are CNC?
Scale: 1 = 0%; 2 = 1-25%; 3 = 26-50%; 4 = 51-75%; 5 = 76-100%.
SV5 Of the other machines currently in use at the plant which make this product, about
what percent have PLC?
Scale: 1 = 0%; 2 = 1-25%; 3 = 26-50%; 4 = 51-75%; 5 = 76-100%.
SV6 About how many robots (programmable machines with at least three axes of movement)
are in use at the plant?
Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-2; 3 = 3-5; 4 = 6-10; 5 = >10.
SV7 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this product
were for ‘your business unit providing technical assistance to customer’?
Scale: 1 = 0-19; 2 = 20-39; 3 = 40-59; 4 = 60-79; 5 = 80-100.
SV8 Which range best describes your business unit’s R&D as a percent of sales?
Scale: 1 = 0%; 2 = 0.1-1%; 3 = 1.1-2%; 4 = 2.1-4%; 5 = >4%.
SV9 Please check the descriptions which apply to the product development process for
your company’s product.
Scale: 1 = customer took entire responsibility; 2 = customer provided majority of
engineering hours; your business unit provided the rest; 3 = customer and your business
unit contributed equally to the design; 4 = your business unit provided majority of
engineering hours; 5 = your business unit took entire responsibility.
08 Alternatives to the supplier SUPALT.
Please indicate the number of automakers of each nationality of ownership to whom you
supply this product from this plant.
09 Customer’s value to the supplier CUSVAL
CV1 Over the last four years, what sorts of technical assistance have you received from your
customer?
Provided personnel who visited your site to aid in implementing improved procedures
for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide. Arranged for training of your
personnel at their site for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide.
Provided personnel who worked two weeks or more on your shop floor to improve
your processes for zero or a nominal charge; for a fee; did not provide.
Scale: one point for each.34
CV2 Approximately what percent of the contacts with your customer regarding this product
were for ‘customer providing technical assistance to your business unit’?
Scale: 1 = 0; 2 = 1-10; 3 = 11-20; 4 = 21-30; 5 = 31-100.
CV3 The advice our customer gives us is not always helpful.
Scale: 1 = strongly agree; 5 = strongly disagree.
CV4 In dealing with this customer, we have learned much that will help us with other
customers.
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.
10 Alternatives to the customer CUSALT
Please indicate the appropriate number of other firms supplying the same product to same
automaker or other firms potentially able to supply similar product (without major
investment).
11 Habituation HABIT
HAB1 For face to face contact. In each year, approximately how often did someone from your
business unit have a substantive discussion with your customer? (Please include
discussions about issues such as design changes and quality problems, but exclude
routine delivery notifications and contacts by resident engineers).
Scale: 1 = every 6 months or less often; 2 = monthly; 3 = weekly; 4 = daily; 5 = more
than once a day.
HAB2 For phone contact. In each year, approximately how often did someone from your
business unit have a substantive discussion with your customer? (Please include
discussions about issues such as design changes and quality problems, but exclude
routine delivery notifications and contacts by resident engineers).
Scale: 1 = every 6 months or less often; 2 = monthly; 3 = weekly; 4 = daily; 5 = more
than once a day.
HAB3 For fax contact. In each year, approximately how often did someone from your
business unit have a substantive discussion with your customer? (Please include
discussions about issues such as design changes and quality problems, but exclude
routine delivery notifications and contacts by resident engineers).
Scale: 1 = every 6 months or less often; 2 = monthly; 3 = weekly; 4 = daily; 5 = more
than once a day.
12 Customer’s Commitment CUSCOM
CC1 How would your customer react if one of your competitors offered a lower price for a
product of equal quality?
Scale: 1 = switch to competitor as soon as technical feasible; 2 = switch at end of
contract; 3 = reduce your market share; 5 = help you match your competitors’ efforts.35
CC2 How would your customer react if your material suppliers raised their prices?
Scale: 1 = reduce your business unit’s market share or switch to another supplier at
end of contract; 2 = hold you to your original price; 3 = allow partial pass-through of
your business unit’s cost increases; 4 = allow full pass-through of your business unit’s
increases in out-of-pocket costs; 5 = provide significant help for your business unit to
reduce costs.
CC3 Suppose your business unit had an idea that would allow you to reduce your costs, but
would require your customer to make a slight modification in its procedures. How would
your customer react?
Scale: 1 = customer does not welcome suggestions that would require modifications
in its procedures; 2 = customer would adopt the suggestion, but would seek to capture
most of the savings; 3 = customer would adopt the suggestion, but would seek to
capture some of the savings; 5 = customer would eagerly solicits such suggestions.
CC4 We can rely on our customer to help us in ways not required by our agreement with
them.
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree.
13 Supplier’s openness SUPOPN
What types of information does your business unit provide to your customer about the
process you use to make the product you listed above?
Detailed breakdown of process steps; cost of each process step; financial information not
publicly available; production scheduling information; type of equipment used; your
sources of supply; detailed information regarding materials you use.
Scale: one point for each.
14 Supplier’s future perspectives SUPFUT
For how long do you think there is a high probability that your business unit will be
supplying this or a similar item to your customer (in years)?
15 Past duration of the relationship PAST
Approximately how long has your firm sold products in this product line to this customer
(in years)?36
Appendix B Correlation Matrix
No Construct Abbrev. Supinv Supdep Cusdep Supunc Supenv Supbeh
01 Supplier's dedicated investments Supinv 1.000
02 Supplier's dependence Supdep 0.330 1.000
03 Customer's dependence Cusdep 0.211 * 0.398 * 1.000
04 Supplier's uncertainty avoidance Supunc -0.189 0.083 0.014 * 1.000
05 Supplier's environmental uncert. Supenv 0.069 * -0.042 * -0.029 ^ 0.039 * 1.000
06 Supplier's behavioral uncertainty Supbeh -0.004 -0.010 -0.061 * 0.153 0.301 * 1.000
07 Supplier's value to the customer Supval 0.288 0.341 0.281 * -0.024 -0.055 * -0.032
08 Alternatives to the supplier Supalt 0.086 0.012 0.002 * -0.023 -0.019 * -0.020
09 Customer's value to the supplier Cusval 0.090 0.099 0.105 * 0.066 -0.068 * -0.295
10 Alternatives to the customer Cusalt -0.038 -0.066 -0.101 * 0.045 0.044 * 0.078
11 Habituation Habit 0.205 * 0.296 * 0.293 ^ 0.037 * -0.022 ^ 0.020 *
12 Customer's commitment Cuscom 0.007 0.040 0.140 * -0.065 -0.121 * -0.467
13 Supplier's openness Supopn 0.114 * 0.223 * 0.172 ^ 0.079 * -0.121 ^ 0.023 *
14 Supplier's future perspectives Supfut 0.071 0.097 0.156 * -0.027 -0.077 * -0.173
15 Past duration Past -0.036 * -0.017 * -0.016 ^ 0.029 * -0.048 ^ 0.085 *
No Abbrev. Supval Supalt Cusval Cusalt Habit Cuscom Supopn Supfut Past
07 Supval 1.000
08 Supalt 0.087 1.000
09 Cusval 0.077 0.062 1.000
10 Cusalt -0.145 -0.031 -0.051 1.000
11 Habit 0.207 * 0.010 * 0.173 * 0.025 * 1.000
12 Cuscom 0.034 0.002 0.331 -0.048 0.119 * 1.000
13 Supopn 0.184 * 0.016 * 0.231 * 0.032 * 0.240 ^ 0.063 * 1.000
14 Supfut 0.088 0.076 0.062 -0.004 0.177 * 0.194 0.001 * 1.000
15 Past 0.038 * 0.022 * -0.039 * 0.161 * 0.120 ^ -0.065 * -0.031 ^ 0.139 * 1.000
Notes:
(1) Pearson correlation coefficients except for * which are polyserial and ^ which are
polychoric correlation coefficients.